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Joe Zhang, Party Man, Company Man, Honolulu: Enrich Profes-
sional Publishing, 2014, 234 pp. ISBN: 978-1-62320-038-1 (paperback).
Joe Zhang is a corporate governance advisor who has worked in the 
ﬁnancial sector for almost 20 years, mainly at UBS and People's Bank 
of China. He is author of Inside China's Shadow Banking: The Next 
Subprime Crisis, which was published in 2013. He is also a regular 
contributor of op-eds and commentary in international newspapers 
such as Financial Times and South China Morning Post.
In the book under review, Joe Zhang's basic argument is that 
China's state sector is rebounding and on track to expand further. 
He also argues that the public in China has faith in the state sector 
and states that 'the public is demanding more, not less involvement 
by the state' (p. xvi).  According to Joe Zhang, this is a fact that has 
largely been ignored by Western observers. His book is an attempt 
to answer why China has developed in a different direction than 
prophesized in Western scholarship. Basically his answer is that 
most people in China realize that only the state can deal with the 
four big challenges China faces—inequality, the environmental cri-
sis, the depletion of resources and overpopulation (p. 194). There 
may be some truth in this. However, Joe Zhang fails to discuss yet 
another, and perhaps even more important, reason for the contin-
ued dominance of the state sector, namely the existence of strong 
and entrenched vested interests that resist further privatization of 
state-owned enterprises. 
Joe Zhang also challenges the widely held assumption that the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are underperforming compared to 
private enterprises. According to this line of thought, which is mostly 
found among Western economists, the private sector is more produc-
tive and proﬁtable than the state sector. Economists afﬁliated with 
the Beijing-based Unirule Institute of Economics also hold this view. 
They argue that if SOEs were given the same conditions in terms of 
bank loans, access to land and price of energy resources they would 
show a deﬁcit rather than the signiﬁcant proﬁts they currently post. 
Joe Zhang disagrees, claiming that the state sector has had a better 
ﬁnancial track record in the past three decades than the private 
sector. In sum, the state sector is dominant in China and has in fact 
in recent years advanced by acquiring a number of private sector 
rivals (guo jin, min tui).
The book is not a scholarly work with a systematic reference 
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system to back up the various claims being made. In fact, most of the 
observations made are based on the author's personal experiences 
working in China's ﬁnancial sector. In spite of these limitations, the 
book does contain some information and insight that may be of use to 
more rigorous scholarship.
One aspect concerns executive remuneration. Joe Zhang mentions 
he has worked as CFO in Shenzhen Investment for almost four years. 
Here, he and about 20 top managers received a salary of about 1–2 
million RMB a year. He mentions that this is a comparatively low 
salary, which makes it difﬁcult to attract top talent from the property 
sector, where salaries are much higher. It is difﬁcult to precisely ﬁgure 
out the remuneration of Chinese managers. According to an index of 
China's 2,310 listed companies, the average salary for CEOs in listed 
companies is 636,000 RMB a year. The highest paid takes home a salary 
of 14.6 million RMB. This is more than 300 times the average salary 
of urban Chinese workers. Although Joe Zhang earns signiﬁcantly 
less, his salary is still about 45 times as high as an ordinary industrial 
worker in China.
Another discussion point is the administrative status of SOEs. Joe 
Zhang mentions that until the mid-1990s, working for an SOE was the 
same as working for a government department. Wages and pensions 
were similar and SOE executives enjoyed administrative ranking. How-
ever, since the 1990s, the government has split the civil service and the 
SOEs. As a consequence, salaries in the SOEs have been delinked from 
civil service salaries, allowing SOE executives to make 10 or 20 times 
more than their political masters (for example ministers).
A third aspect of the continued strong position of SOEs is that the 
top managers in SOEs often rotate with regular government ofﬁcials. In 
this way SOE leaders keep their important contacts in the government. 
In the case of Shenzhen Investment, where Joe Zhang worked for four 
years, the chairman of the company, Hu Aimin, was for many years 
secretary general of the city council. The CEO of the company, Zhang 
Yijun, had been chief of the auditor bureau in Shenzhen.
Even though the 'Party' is mentioned in the title of the book, Joe Zhang 
writes very little about the Communist Party of China (CPC). This is 
disappointing as the CPC has a dominating role in public life in China. 
To understand how the state sector functions in terms of leadership 
issues and personnel, one has to study the CPC. The top leadership 
group of the largest Chinese business groups, the so-called national 
champions, are appointed by the Party's powerful Central Organiza-
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Leta Hong Fincher, Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality 
in China (Asian Arguments series), London & New York: Zed Books, 
2014, 192 pp. ISBN: 978-1-78032-921-5 (paperback).
This book examines the resurgence of gender inequality in China with a 
focus on residential property. Leta Hong Fincher argues that real estate 
is an important indicator of women's socio-economic status in urban 
China since 'Chinese consumers have very few places to invest their 
money, so most people invest it in a home, which is the most valuable 
family asset and worth much more than income alone' (p. 5). The author 
begins her investigation by looking into the so-called 'leftover woman', 
a derogatory term used to refer to 'an urban, professional female in her 
late twenties or older who is still single' (p. 2). By analysing various of-
ﬁcial media news reports and television programmes, the author shows 
how the state-sponsored 'leftover woman' campaign stigmatizes single 
women in their late twenties and presses them to 'rush into marriage 
with the wrong man' (p. 16). Consequently, women also 'make excessive 
personal and ﬁnancial compromises' (p. 6) in conjugal relations in order 
to keep the marriage. Home real estate, for the most part, is registered 
under the man's name; married women have no legal home-ownership 
rights and are therefore deprived of their equal share in 'China's urban 
real-estate boom' (p. 11). 
tion Department—not by the central government or the boards of the 
companies in question. 
The book is written in ﬁrst person, where the author himself is centre 
stage. This makes the book easy to read. However, it subtracts from the 
academic quality. It is also disappointing that there are very few Chinese 
language books and articles in the reference list/bibliography. Lack of 
academic quality and rigour is also reﬂected in the fact that there is no 
methodological and theoretical discussion informing the reader how the 
author intends to go about his research. The result is a rather descriptive 
book, which will have a limited academic impact.
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